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I. INTRODUCTION
The Arctic lays north of the Arctic Circle, at a minimum latitude of
66.33°, that is, the most northerly of the major circles of the Earth’s
latitude. The Arctic Circle is essentially an ocean surrounded by land;
it includes portions of the territories of the United States, Canada,
Denmark (notably Greenland), Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia,
as well as parts of Iceland’s continental shelf. Part of the Arctic
territory is subject to temperatures that are permanently lower than the
freezing point of water and thus constitutes the “permafrost.”1 To a
large extent, ice covers the Arctic Ocean, halving in summer and
expanding in fall and winter. Only 28 percent of the ice pack is multiannual, with a thickness that is up to 3-4 meters and ridges up to 20
meters.2
The Antarctic Circle is situated 66.33° in the southern hemisphere
as the most southern of the major circles of the Earth’s latitude.3 The
Antarctic Circle is a land mass surrounded by water, whereby
Antarctica is a land covering most of the Circle, with an emerging
surface of around 14 million square kilometers. Ice covers
approximately 98 percent of this land, with an average thickness of
2,300 meters and a maximum thickness of 4,800 meters.4 The
temperature varies between -68 °C on the plateau in winter and 0 °C
at the coast in summer.5
Scientific evidence proves that climate change particularly impacts
the Polar Regions to the extent that the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) estimates that both the Arctic and Antarctic are
1. See
Arctic,
NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC
(Oct.
6,
2016),
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/arctic; Troy Péwé, Permafrost,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA
(Feb.
26,
2001),
https://www.britannica.com/science/permafrost.
2. All About Ice: Arctic vs. Antarctic, NATIONAL SNOW AND ICE DATA CENTER,
https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/seaice/characteristics/difference.html (last visited Jan.
12, 2020); see also Arctic, supra note 1.
3. Antarctica,
WORLD
ATLAS
(Sept.
19,
2016),
https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/an.htm.
4. Id. at 2.
5. Melissa McDaniel et al., Antarctica, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 4, 2012)
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/antarctica.
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warming twice as fast as the rest of the world.6 Notably, according to
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), global
warming is affecting the Polar Regions at such a fast pace that some
components cannot successfully adapt.7 Impressive satellite images
immediately show ice shrinking, as compared to previous decades.8
The decay of sea ice in the Arctic is particularly evident in summer
and similar trends emerge in some areas of Antarctica. This further
entails the thawing of permafrost, which intensifies the release of
methane and CO2 induced by climate change: a new “Age of the
Arctic” has commenced.9 For the time being, the Antarctic Treaty has
“frozen” sovereign claims over the Antarctic.10 However, climate
change arguably has the potential to unlock such claims, which entails
the possibility of economic exploitation and further environmental
pollution. The Polar Regions thus face a concrete risk of irreversible
effects, with little room for adaptation strategies.
Research in the area mostly addresses climate change as part of the
question of the governance of either the Antarctic or the Arctic, with
a predominant emphasis on the Northern Region.11 Such a focus
follows a regional paradigm, which favours particular regulation,12

6. See Year of Polar Prediction – From Research to Improved Environmental
Safety, WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION (May 15, 2017),
https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/year-of-polar-prediction%E2%80%93-from-research-improved-environmental-safety; see also SUSAN JOY
HASSOL, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT: IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC
20 (2004).
7. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1570 (2014).
8. Sea Ice Extent Sinks to Record Lows at Both Poles, NASA (Mar. 22, 2017)
https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2017/sea-ice-extent-sinks-to-record-lowsat-both-poles.
9. Sebastian Keil & Kathrin Knecht, Governing the Arctic as a Globally
Embedded Space, in GOVERNING ARCTIC CHANGE: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 302
(Sebastian Keil & Kathrin Knecht eds., 2017).
10. See John Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 1959, 9 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 436,
468 (1960) (explaining that the Antarctic Treaty has preserved the Antarctic for
scientific co-operation and exchange of data information while effectively banning
militarization of the area).
11. Timo Koivurova, How to Improve Arctic International Governance, 6 U. C.
IRV. L. REV. 83 (2016).
12. FREDRIK SÖDERBAUM, RETHINKING REGIONALISM 10 (2016).
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according to the leading political approach to the Polar Regions.13
Within this framework, it has been proposed that States adopt a
comprehensive treaty for the Artic, along the lines of the Antarctic
Treaty.14 Most scholars, however, have rejected the option in light of
the different nature of the Arctic and Antarctic Regions, based on the
respective ratio of water and land.15
This article integrates a regional focus with a universal standpoint,
which endorses a more comprehensive approach to international
regulation, according to “a global perspective that also takes into
account regional particularities and contexts.”16 Against this
background, the analysis addresses the relationship between the
governance of the Polar Regions and global climate change regulation,
assessing whether there should be a paradigm shift from a regional
approach to global governance, and if the Arctic and the Antarctic
should contribute to framing the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Considering the possibility of
harmonizing multiple regulatory frameworks, the research addresses
first the governance of the Arctic and the Antarctic, from a regional
perspective, and second the relationship between the Polar Regions
and global regulation of climate change, taking on a universal
standpoint. Along these lines, the analysis is divided into three
sections. The first section considers sovereign claims over the
Antarctic, their suspension under the Antarctic Treaty, and the
potential of climate change to unlock such claims. The second section
focuses on sovereign claims over the Arctic, particularly under the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),17 and the
extension of those claims in light of global warming. The third section
envisages possible regulatory options to protect the Polar Regions
from the impact of climate change in the long term, considering the
prospective legal status of the Arctic and the Antarctic and the
13. See Prime Minister’s Office of Finland, Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic
Region 2013 44 (Aug. 23, 2013) (Fin.) (asserting that Finland’s objective regarding
the Artic region is to establish consistent regulation).
14. Stefán Þór Hauksson, A Legally Binding Regime for the Arctic 23 (2009),
https://skemman.is/bitstream/1946/3090/1/prentun_fixed.pdf.
15. Timo Koivurova, Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty – Evaluation and a New
Proposal 17 RECIEL 14, 17–19 (2008).
16. SÖDERBAUM, supra note 12, at 10.
17. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
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possibility of integrating a regional approach with a global governance
of the Polar Regions.

II. A LAND MASS SURROUNDED BY WATER: THE
ANTARCTIC CIRCLE
A. “FROZEN” CUSTOMARY SOVEREIGN CLAIMS
Since Antarctica was discovered in 1773, Argentina, Australia,
Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom have
advanced sovereign territorial claims over 85 percent of the
continent.18 Some claims overlap, notably those of Chile, Argentina,
and the United Kingdom. Under the Australian Antarctic Territory
Acceptance Act 1933, Australia has submitted a claim covering 42
percent of the Antarctic territory. The 2016 Australian Antarctic
Strategy and Twenty Year Action Plan claims to “preserve
sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory, including
sovereign rights over adjacent offshore areas.”19 The United States and
Russia have reserved to submit sovereign claims at a later point in
time.20
Claims to sovereignty over the Antarctic have different bases, such
as discovery, exploration, historic rights, contiguity, and the sector
principle. Specifically, in light of the sector principle, States assert
sovereignty following straight lines of longitude converging to the
Pole.21 These arguments alone, however, do not seem to (yet) have
customary status in international law and occupation remains an

18. See Australian Antarctic Data Centre, Antarctica and the Southern Ocean:
Territorial Claims and CCMLR Statistical Reporting Subareas (Map Catalogue No.
13111, Department of the Environment and Heritage: Australian Antarctic Division,
Nov.
2004),
http://www.antarctica.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/179883/AntarcticTerritorial-Claims-map-13111_300dpi.pdf [hereinafter Antarctica and the Southern
Ocean] (illustrating sovereign territorial claims over Antarctica).
19. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, AUSTRALIAN ANTARCTIC STRATEGY AND
20 YEAR ACTION PLAN 17 (2016).
20. See Perry Carter et al., Russia’s “Smart Power” Foreign Policy and
Antarctica, 6 POLAR J. 259, 264 (2016); Christopher C. Joyner, United States
Foreign Policy Interests in the Antarctic, 1 POLAR J. 17, 21 (2011).
21. See Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, supra note 18.
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essential element to prove sovereignty.22 In particular, the sector
principle is based on a parallel approach to the Arctic, where States
whose territory extends north of 66.33° should ipso facto acquire
sovereignty. However, the theory itself is controversial, and no State
territory extends south of 66.33°.23 Thus, while the claimants have
reciprocally recognized sovereign rights, other States have not.24
Nonetheless, the validity of recognition cannot be absolutely
excluded; in fact, the time necessary for the formation of a customary
rule varies, and the sudden emergence of a customary practice is
possible. For instance, the general norm that a State has no sovereignty
over the space route followed by artificial satellites developed
immediately after the launching of Sputnik 1.25
In 1959, the United States convened an Antarctic Conference in
Washington, including Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the Soviet
Union, and the seven States advancing territorial claims over
Antarctica.26 The Conference adopted the Antarctic Treaty,27 which is
the central piece of the Antarctic Treaty System. The Antarctic Treaty
is a short text of 14 articles that apply to the area south of 60° South
Latitude (Article VI). The Preamble specifies that the Treaty aims to
preserve the Antarctic for humankind, dedicating it to peaceful
purposes (Preamble and Article I) and promoting freedom of scientific
22. See Thomas Willing Balch, Arctic and Antarctic Regions and the Law of
Nations, 4 AM. J. INT’L L. 265, 271 (1910) (arguing that the claims are not valid as
sovereign nations are merely claiming territories to prevent other nations from
establishing themselves, which is temporary and symbolic rather than real and
durable).
23. See Benedetto Conforti, Territorial Claims in Antarctica: A Modern Way to
Deal with an Old Problem, 19 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 249, 253–54 (1986) (stating that
there are no claimed territories beyond 60° South latitude).
24. See Joyner, supra note 20, at 22 (“[T]he sector areas must be occupied by a
population that has permanently settled the claimed territory, a government must be
in place to administer civil affairs, and there must be internationally recognized
borders separating the claims.”); Jill Grob, Antarctica’s Frozen Territorial Claims:
A Meltdown Proposal, 30 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 461, 464 (2007) (“The
United States and Soviet Union, however, abide by a ‘no claims’ principle, whereby
they assert no claims and acknowledge no claims by others, while still reserving the
right to make future claims.”).
25. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (8th ed. 2017).
26. See Letter from John Hanessian, Scott Polar Institute, to Richard Nolte,
Exec. Dir., Institute of Current World Affairs (May 3, 1960) (on file with ICWA).
27. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
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research and cooperation (Articles II and III).28 The Treaty is
consistent with the application of the international law of the sea, but
prevails as lex specialis (Article VI).29
Institutionally, the Antarctic Treaty is administered via the
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), which recommends
measures aiming at implementation to Governments.30 According to
Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, there are three categories of State
Parties. The first category includes the 12 original signatory States,
who enjoy full rights and participate in decision-making within the
ATCMs via appointed representatives under Antarctic Treaty Article
IX(1).31 The second category is comprised of the 42 currently acceding
States, including China, Germany, and Brazil, who prove their interest
in the Antarctic by conducting substantial scientific research. They
also may vote in the ATCMs under Antarctic Treaty Article IX(2),32
and ATCM measures become binding for them if approved by all
consultative parties under Antarctic Treaty Article IX(1) and (4).33 The
final category includes the 25 currently non-consultative States,
including Canada and Switzerland, who have participated in ATCMs
since 1983 without voting rights.34
Article IV(1)(a)-(b) of the Antarctic Treaty provides that the Parties
do not renounce previously asserted rights of, or claims to, territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica and their basis.35 Under Article IV(1)(c),
membership also does not prejudice the position of any Contracting
Party concerning the recognition or non-recognition of any other
State’s rights of, or claim, or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty.36
No new claim or enlargement of an existing claim to territorial
28. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 27, pmbl., arts. 1–3.
29. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 27, art. 6.
30. See ATCM and Other Meetings, SECRETARIAT OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY,
https://www.ats.aq/e/atcm.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2019) (explaining that the
purpose of the ATCM is to fulfill the principles and objectives of the Antarctic
Treaty in order to comply with the obligations listed under Article IX of the Treaty).
31. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 27, art. 9.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See
Parties,
SECRETARIAT
OF
THE
ANTARCTIC
TREATY,
https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Parties?lang=e (last visited Nov. 16, 2019).
35. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 27, art. 4.
36. Id.
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sovereignty can be asserted, as long as the Antarctic Treaty is in force
(Article IV(2)).37 The Treaty therefore “freezes” territorial claims,
“crystallizing” the legal situation existing at the time of its
conclusion.38 Other conventions within the Antarctic Treaty System
support this regime. Notably, under Article IV of the Convention for
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR),39
the Parties commit to abiding by the obligations under Article IV of
the Antarctic Treaty.
On this basis, it is questionable whether States having frozen
entitlements to territorial sovereignty may advance maritime claims
over waters surrounding Antarctica. It is indeed disputed whether the
Antarctic Continent can generate a territorial sea, contiguous zone,
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and continental shelf under
international law. Notably, CCAMLR Article IV(2)(B) provides that
the Convention does not prejudice “any right or claim or basis of claim
to exercise coastal State jurisdiction under international law.”40 This
reference has triggered a “bifocal” interpretation, depending on
whether it has a broader focus on the coasts of Antarctica, according
to States advancing territorial claims, or a narrower one on a few
islands under undisputed sovereignty south of 66.33°.41 The prevailing
view is negative. Thus, Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, the
Russian Federation, and the United States have excluded the
possibility of claiming an extended continental shelf in the Antarctic.
The United States clearly affirmed that it “does not recognize any
State’s claim to territory in Antarctica,” or to “the seabed and subsoil
of the submarine areas beyond and adjacent to the continent of
Antarctica.”42 This approach assumes that the actual absence of
37. Id.
38. Douglas M. Zang, Frozen in Time: The Antarctic Mineral Resource
Convention, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 722, 729 (1991).
39. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources art.
4, May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476; 1329 U.N.T.S. 48.
40. Id.
41. See Conforti, supra note 23, at 250–51.
42. U.S. Mission to the U.N., Diplomatic Note to the U.N. Secretary General on
Australia’s Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(Dec.
3,
2004),
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/aus04/Reaction_by_Stat
es.pdf.
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territorial sovereignty excludes claims over maritime areas.43
Nonetheless, in light of its asserted sovereignty since 1973, Australia
has claimed a territorial sea and an EEZ in the Antarctic under the
Maritime Legislation Amendment Act 1994.44 This approach is
grounded in the idea that the Antarctic Treaty freezes sovereign claims
over emerged land only.45 In 2004, acting under UNCLOS Article
76(8), Australia requested the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS) “not to take any action for the time being
with regard to the information” that “relates to the continental shelf
appurtenant to Antarctica.”46 Similarly, the United Kingdom and New
Zealand have not renounced the possibility of submitting to the CLCS
data on their extended Antarctic continental shelves.47
Article XII(2)(a) of the Antarctic Treaty initially provided that any
Party could call for a review conference after 30 years, but no Party
exercised this right. Rather, in 1991 the Parties acknowledged the
continuing relevance of the Treaty by adopting a declaration recording
their determination to maintain and strengthen the Treaty and to
dedicate Antarctica to environmental and scientific purposes.48 Under
Article 25(5) of the 1991 Environmental Protocol, which entered into
43. See Anna Horman, Maritime Zones in Antarctica, 20 AUSTL. & N.Z. MAR.
L.J. 69, 72 (2006).
44. See id. at 74 (explaining that “Australia has been the most active claimant
State” to assert rights over maritime space in the Antarctic Treaty area).
45. See id. at 71 (explaining how States are able to claim maritime zones in
Antarctic waters).
46. Note from the Permanent Mission of Australia to the U.N. to the SecretaryGeneral of the U.N. Accompanying its Submission, Note No. 89/2004 (Nov. 2004),
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/aus04/Documents/aus_d
oc_es_attachment.pdf.
47. Note from the New Zealand Permanent Mission to the U.N. to the U.N.
Secretary-General on Its Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, Note No. NZ-CLCS-TPN-02 (Apr. 19, 2006),
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/nzl_doc_es_attach
ment.pdf (indicating that N.Z. may make a later submission including areas of the
continental shelf appurtenant to Antarctica); Note from the United Kingdom Mission
to the U.N. Secretary-General on Its Submission to the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf, note No. 168/08 (May 9, 2004),
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/gbr08/gbr_nv_9may200
8.pdf (indicating that the U.K. retains the right to advance claims over areas of the
continental shelf appurtenant to Antarctica in a later submission).
48. Final Act, Final Report of the Eleventh Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative
Meeting, Madrid, October 3–4, 1991, at 109.
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force in 1998, mining activities have been excluded in the Antarctic
until 2048.

B. THE POTENTIAL OF CLIMATE CHANGE TO UNLOCK
SOVEREIGNTY
The background against which the Antarctic Treaty must be
considered is the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ). As far as 1931, the Court held that
permanent ice-covered lands like Greenland are capable of attracting
territorial sovereignty. In Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, the
Court adjudicated upon the validity of the declaration of occupation of
Eastern Greenland between Carlsberg and Bessel Fjords by the King
of Norway, since Denmark claimed sovereignty over the territories in
question.49 The Court considered that, for a claim of occupation to be
effective, it is necessary that a State shows the intention to act as a
sovereign and adequately exercises sovereignty. However, in the case
of “claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled
countries,” the Court was satisfied with “very little in the way of the
actual exercise of sovereign rights.”50 Concerning “Arctic” and
“inaccessible” territory, the Court thus required a minimal threshold
of possession and low-intensity administration, such as legislation on
fishing and scientific expeditions.51 Despite the contrary argument
that, unlike Antarctica, Danish sovereignty over Eastern Greenland
was uncontested,52 given that it is a vast land mass, there is a
potentially valid ground to affirm that Antarctica may be subject to
sovereign claims, even if its territory is not populated and
administration is minimal.
Whereas the Antarctic Treaty has “frozen” sovereign claims for
several years, the situation on the ground discloses actual disputes. In
fact, the Treaty created a practice of “sovereignty watch,” defusing
ownership but not removing the need for vigilance by States claiming
49. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 53, at 26 (Apr. 5).
50. Id. at 46.
51. Id. at 50–51, 62–63.
52. See Conforti, supra note 23, at 256 (explaining that the P.C.I.J. granted
Danish sovereignty over the eastern part of Greenland because no State opposed
Denmark’s claims).
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sovereignty.53 Fighting for territory, States have torn down each
other’s flags and destroyed foreign scientific stations.54 Countries have
also constantly performed “ceremonies of possession,” for instance,
sending political leaders to the continent, issuing Antarctic stamps,
drawing maps, and carefully recording discoveries.55 In 1955, the
United Kingdom went as far as to act in the ICJ against Argentina and
Chile to obtain recognition of its claims, but action failed because of
lack of consent to jurisdiction.56
Several Antarctic stations seem to have been established to obtain
consultative party status under the Antarctic Treaty System, including
providing few personnel and developing limited scientific research,
but rather aiming to display a practice of “effective occupation,”
whereby the United States and United Kingdom produce 41 percent of
all Antarctic science.57 The international community has thus
succeeded in the effort of building an international station in outer
space but not an international research base in Antarctica. It is
therefore realistic to conclude that “the quest for sovereignty in
Antarctica has never ceased” and “the continent’s political future
looks increasingly uncertain.”58
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty is meaningfully considered the
cornerstone of not only the Treaty itself but also of the third wave of
“Antarctic imperialism,” given that the provision has allowed the
United States and Antarctic States to exercise incisive governance
over the Antarctic.59 Against this background, the impact of climate
53. Klaus J. Dodds, Sovereignty Watch: Claimant States, Resources, and
Territory in Contemporary Antarctica, 47 POLAR REC. 231, 232 (2011) (identifying
the geopolitical actions of States performed in order to maintain a veil of sovereignty
over Antarctica).
54. See Doaa Abdel-Motaal, Averting the Battle for Antarctica, 12 YALE J. INT’L
AFF. 1, 3 (2017) (describing the territorial battles fought over Antarctica).
55. See Dodds, supra note 53, at 233–34 (citing Patricia Seed’s work on
colonization and sovereign authority).
56. See Antarctica Case (U.K. v. Arg.), Order, 1956 I.C.J. 12–14 (Mar. 16);
Antarctica Case (U.K. v. Chile), Order, 1956 I.C.J. 15–17 (Mar. 16).
57. See Indi Hodgson-Johnston, Australian Politics and Antarctic Sovereignty:
Themes, Protagonists and Antagonists, 7 AUSTL. J. MAR. & OCEAN AFF. 183, 193
(2015) (explaining that Australian sovereignty in Antarctica is intertwined with its
scientific presence on the continent).
58. Abdel-Motaal, supra note 54, at 6.
59. See Shirley V. Scott, Ingenious and Innocuous? Article IV of the Antarctic
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change has not been frequently considered. Even the Australian
Parliamentary debate has overlooked the question.60 However, climate
change has the potential to increase sovereign tensions; while it would
make sense to keep “freezing” territorial claims in light of the
exceptional environment of the Continent and its contribution to the
global ecological balance, this argument no longer stands if the
Antarctic ice-cap melts. Data suggest that Antarctic ice sheets are
melting nearly six times faster than forty years ago, with an average
loss of 252 billion tons per year, leaving large portions of ice in the
continent in danger of collapse.61 The loss of Antarctic frozen
environment would facilitate effective occupation and unlock
territorial sovereignty.
Significantly, Chile and Argentina purposely established civilian
settlements on the Antarctic Continent. In 1978, Argentina backed its
sovereign claims by sending around ten families to the Esperanza
base.62 In 1984, Chile managed to have a national, Juan Pablo
Camocho, born at the Frei Montalva base on the South Shetland
Islands of Antarctica.63 These settlements have grown over time, and
the Antarctic Treaty does not address them. It is thus arguable that, if
temperatures keep rising, States will increasingly send people to live

Treaty as Imperialism, 1 POLAR J. 51, 60–61 (2011) (explaining that the Antarctic
Treaty served U.S. interests by giving the United States legal access to the entire
continent while quietly reducing effective sovereignty of other claimant States).
60. See Hodgson-Johnston, supra note 57, at 194–95 (highlighting the fact that,
although climate change has often been debated, it is rarely explored in terms of
sovereignty).
61. See Alex Fox, East Antarctica’s Ice Is Melting at an Unexpectedly Rapid
Clip,
New
Study
Suggests
(Jan.
14,
2019),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/01/east-antarctica-s-ice-meltingunexpectedly-rapid-clip-new-study-suggests (noting that six times more Antarctic
ice flows are currently sent into the ocean each year than in 1979); Aylin Woodward,
One of Antarctica’s Biggest Glaciers Will Soon Reach a Point of Irreversible
Melting That Would Cause Sea Levels to Rise at Least 1.6 Feet, BUSINESS INSIDER
(July 9, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/antarctic-glacier-on-way-toirreversible-melt-2019-7.
62. See Abdel-Motaal, supra note 54, at 5–6 (explaining that Argentina and
Chile purposely established civilian settlements in Antarctica to strengthen their
claims of sovereignty).
63. See id. at 6 (stating that Juan Pablo Camocho’s birth was a response to
Argentinian Emilio Marcos Palma becoming the first person born in Antarctica).
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on the Continent.64
In practice, warming in the Antarctic has recently disclosed tensions
over sovereignty that might undermine the consensus underpinning
the Antarctic Treaty. States may be less willing to sacrifice sovereign
claims if climate change and technological advances make mining a
profitable business.65 Prior to the 2017 ATCM, China released a white
paper on its expanding Antarctic activities, allotting more money to
scientific research and reaffirming aversion to the commercial
exploitation of Antarctic resources.66 At the 41st ATCM, in 2018 China
officially presented plans for establishing a new Antarctic research
station in the Ross Sea.67 Observers underscored the effort to increase
the Chinese influence on Antarctic governance and others States, for
instance, the United States and New Zealand, are concerned that China
engages in undeclared mineral resource exploration and military
activities on the Continent.68 The Lowy Institute for International
Policy encouraged Australia to begin diplomatic preparations for the
2048 review of the Antarctic Treaty, considering that the question of
recovering mineral resources from the Antarctic will undoubtedly
64. See id. at 7 (recognizing that, as temperatures rise and Antarctica becomes
more habitable, States will feel more pressure to exploit the continent by establishing
a local population).
65. See Jeffrey Loan, The Common Heritage of Mankind in Antarctica: An
Analysis in Light of the Threats Posed by Climate Change, 1 N.Z. Y.B. OF INT’L L.
149, 159–60, 180–81 (2004) (explaining that the Antarctic Treaty System may be
strengthened by strategic planning over mining resources).
66. Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Report of the Informal Discussion
for the Intersessional Period of 2016/17 on the Proposal for a New Antarctic
Specially Managed Area at Chinese Antarctic Kunlun Station, Dome A, 3, WP 35
(July 4, 2017); Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Report of the 2015/15
Intersessional Informal Discussions on the Proposal for a New Antarctic Specially
Managed Area at Chinese Antarctic Kunlun Station, Dome A and the Follow-up
Work, 6, WP 29 (Nov. 4, 2016).
67. Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, Report of the Twenty-First Meeting of the
Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP XXI), in Final Report of the FortyFirst Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, at 67 (vol. 1) (2018).
68. See Anne-Marie Brady, China’s Rise in Antarctica?, 50 ASIAN SURV. 759,
768 (2010); see also Anne-Marie Brady, China’s Expanding Antarctic Interests:
Implications for New Zealand, SMALL STATES AND THE NEW SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT
(June
2017),
https://www.canterbury.ac.nz/media/documents/research/China%27s-expandingAntarctic-interests.pdf. (claiming that China has never stopped exploring Antarctic
mineral resources despite environmental protection protocols).
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resurface, together with claims to common management of the
region,69 along the lines of Malaysia’s submissions to the United
Nations in the 1980s.70 This has the potential to reignite unresolved
competitive tensions, as well as “military-infused displays of power
projection.”71
The validity of sovereign claims should be determined in light of
the status of Antarctica as either terra nullius or res communis
omnium.72 If Antarctica is terra nullius, nothing prevents occupation.
In this case, arguably occupation has thus far been prevented, inter
alia, by prohibitive living conditions. If temperatures increase and ice
melts, it is difficult to see why occupation should not take place. If
some States establish sovereignty over Antarctica, coastal States will
have the right to claim a territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf,
possibly extended, under UNCLOS. Climate change will have a
decisive impact on maritime delimitation, particularly in light of the
fact that the definition of baselines is disputed in Antarctica,
depending on whether ice is stable enough to meet territorial features
69. See Ellie Fogarty, Antarctica: Assessing and Protecting Australia’s National
Interests, LOWY INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY, 10 (Aug. 3, 2011),
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/antarctica-assessing-and-protectingaustralia-national-interests (recommending that Australia begin diplomatic
consultations with other claimant States in order to develop a response to the idea of
preserving Antarctica as common heritage of mankind).
70. See U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., 10th plen. mtg. at 129, 132, U.N. Doc.
A/37/PV.10, ¶¶ 1, 36 (Sept. 29, 1982) [hereinafter UNGA 37th Session] (arguing
that the resources in the Antarctic should be divided among the nations of the world,
not just the discoverers); see also infra Section IV. B; Moritaka Hayashi, The
Antarctica Question in the United Nations, 19 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 275, 276–77
(1986) (explaining that Malaysia requested the U.N.G.A. to take up the question of
Antarctica).
71. See Jemilla Raphael, South of South – Australia and Its Influence in the
Antarctic, 12 BULL. OF THE CENT. FOR E.-W. CULTURAL & ECON. STUD. 23, 29–30
(2018) (hypothesizing that revising the Antarctica Treaty to delineate surveillance
and signalling for military purposes as opposed to scientific purposes could lead to
provocation).
72. Terra Nullius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A territory not
belonging to any particular country.”); John H. Currie, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2d ed. 2008) (“Res communes - Areas beyond, and not subject to incorporation into,
State territory; thus available for unilateral use and exploitation by all States;
examples include the high seas”); Alexandre Kiss, The Common Heritage of
Mankind: Utopia or Reality?, 40 INT’L J. 423, 425, 428 (1985); W. Lakhtine, Rights
Over the Arctic, 24 AM. J. INT’L L. 703, 704 (1930).
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rather than being classified as sea.73 By contrast, the status of
Antarctica as res communis would prevent occupation. However, the
reason for a land mass to have the status of res communis must be
distinguishing with respect to other land masses. This can be found in
the unique environment of Antarctica, which is covered with ice and
critical to the ecological balance of the planet. If the ice pack melts,
the specific environment of Antarctica is likely to radically change,
and loss of uniqueness is likely to trigger sovereign claims over land
mass and adjacent sea.

III. AN OCEAN SURROUNDED BY LAND: THE
ARCTIC CIRCLE
A. EFFECTIVE SOVEREIGN CLAIMS UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA
Unlike Antarctica, the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by land, hence
it is largely governed by UNCLOS, as the 2008 Iliussat Declaration
recognizes.74 The continent is prospectively rich in onshore and
offshore hydrocarbons, minerals, fisheries, bio resources and
freshwater.75 Within this framework, States dispute sovereignty over a
few territories. For instance, since 1973, while delimiting the
continental shelf between Greenland and Canada, Denmark and
Canada have contended sovereignty over Hans Island, a tiny land
between Greenland and Canada’s Ellesmere Island.76 In 1920, the
United States, United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan,
73. See Joan E. Moore, The Polar Regions and the Law of the Sea, 8 CASE W.
RES J. INT’L L. 204, 206 (1976) (explaining that ice occurs in three different forms
in Antarctica, and not all are stable enough to resemble land).
74. Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference, May 28, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 382
(2009) (recognizing that the law of the sea provides an extensive international legal
framework for the Arctic Ocean).
75. See, e.g., Antarctica, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://www.britannica.com/place/Antarctica (explaining that there is a high degree
of certainty that Antarctica is minerally rich, both on- and off-shore).
76. Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the
Government of Canada Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
between Greenland and Canada, Can.-Den., art. 1, Dec. 17, 1973, 950 U.N.T.S. 152–
54; see also BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, No. 72,
CONTINENTAL SHELF BOUNDARY: CANADA-GREENLAND 7 (1976) (explaining that
Hans island was discounted in the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary
between Canada and Denmark).
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Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden concluded a Treaty
acknowledging Norwegian sovereignty over the Svalbard Archipelago
(Article 1), subject to the right of the other States to develop
commercial activities in the area (Articles 3 ff).77 Later on, the
U.S.S.R. acknowledged Norwegian sovereignty by means of
diplomatic correspondence.78 The U.S.S.R. has also advanced claims
to sovereignty over a relatively stable ice pack in the Arctic.79 The
majority view is that the Arctic ice pack is part of the sea,80 but a
different approach might be considered in light of the uncertain debate
over the status of Antarctic ice.81
The main controversies concern coastal States’ continental shelves
and EEZs. The geographic North Pole is situated around 400 nautical
miles north of any emerged land. This raises the possibility of
overlapping claims to extended continental shelves.82 Under UNCLOS
Article 6(8), Russia, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Canada, and the
United States have indeed made submissions on the extension of their
continental shelves to the CLCS, but they need to reach an agreement
on delimitation under UNCLOS Article 83 to issue exploitation
licenses. In 2008, Arctic coastal States committed to a peaceful
resolution of controversies via the Ilulissat Declaration, but Russia and
Denmark have advanced claims extending the outer limit of their
continental shelves to the North Pole and beyond, and the Canadian
government is working on a similar hypothesis.83
77. Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, arts. 1, 3, Feb. 9, 1920,
43 U.S.T. 1892, 2 L.N.T.S. 7.
78. See Lakhtine, supra note 72, at 709 (explaining that, while in the 1920s the
U.S.S.R. was not a party to the Spitzbergen Treaty, it recognized Norway’s claims
by establishing diplomatic relations with Norway).
79. See id. at 712 (citing a Soviet concept of including ice blocks in legal Polar
territory).
80. See Balch, supra note 22, at 266 (explaining that the Arctic ice pack is
continually moving and therefore territorially precarious).
81. See supra Section II. B.
82. See Markus Kröger, The Global Land Rush and the Arctic, in THE GLOBAL
ARCTIC HANDBOOK 28, 31–32 (Matthias Finger & Lassi Heininen eds., 2019)
(noting States’ intentions to increase development in the Arctic region and predicting
increased exploitation of forest and mineral sources owing to commodity super
cycles).
83. Ragnhild Groenning, Exploring Continental Shelf Claims in the Arctic, THE
ARCTIC INSTITUTE (June 27, 2017) https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/continentalshelf-claims-arctic-infographic (providing further details on claims advanced by
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Northeast of the border between Alaska and the Yukon Territory,
Canada and the United States claim a 21,436 km² pie-shaped sector in
the Beaufort Sea. The controversy is based on a Convention concluded
in 1825 by Great Britain and Russia, which then held title over Alaska
and Canada, addressing the Limits of their Respective Possessions on
the North-West Coast of America and the Navigation of the Pacific
Ocean.84 Canada argues that the maritime boundary should follow the
141° western meridian straight north. By contrast, the United States
demands that any points of the boundary have equal distance from
adjacent coasts, based on equity.85 Canada also contends with
Denmark a fisheries zone in the Lincoln Sea, within the context of the
delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ to the north of Greenland
and Ellesmere Island, based on equidistance between adjacent coasts.
Denmark, instead, draws baselines including Beaumont Island as a
reference point, moving the equidistance line westward.86
Norway and Russia contend the extent of their EEZs and continental
shelves in the Barents Sea, where Statoil and Gazprom operate.87
Russia, Denmark, and Canada to extend their continental shelves, corresponding to
ice melt in the Arctic); Daniel Brownstein, Arctic Circles, MUSINGS ON MAPS (Dec.
25, 2014), https://dabrownstein.com/tag/mapping-polar-sovereignty (noting that
melting Arctic ice is prompting Canada to make a claim outside the jurisdictional
limits of its EEZ); Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 74 (expressing the Arctic States’
intent to follow the international legal framework under the Law of the Sea for
governance over the Arctic and to work with the International Maritime
Organization to address pollution issues).
84. Convention between Great Britain and Russia, Gr. Brit.-Russ., arts. 3–4, Feb.
28, 1825, British and Foreign State Papers (1824–1825).
85. See James S. Baker & Michael Byers, Crossed Lines: The Curious Case of
the Beaufort Sea Maritime Boundary Dispute, 43 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 70, 71–
72 (2012) (noting the United States’ position that current maritime delimitation
methods apply beyond the coastline and, since the area in question tilts eastsoutheast, the equidistant line would place the maritime boundary east of Canada’s
claimed 141º W meridian).
86. See Tullio Scovazzi, Sovereignty over Land and Sea in the Arctic Area, 34
AGENDA INT’L 169, 184–87 (2016) (“A number of boundaries have still to be settled,
including [ . . . ] the boundary between Canada and Denmark in the Lincoln Sea, as
regards North Greenland and the Queen Elizabeth Islands.”).
87. See Daniel Fjærtoft et al., Unitization of Petroleum Fields in the Barents Sea:
Towards a Common Understanding?, 9 ARCTIC REV. ON L. & POL. 72, 73 (2018)
(recounting Russia and Norway’s historical claims dispute in the Barents Sea and
resolution by way of treaty); Arild Moe et al., Space and Timing: Why Was the
Barents Sea Delimitation Dispute Resolved in 2010?, 34 POLAR GEOGRAPHY 145,
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Norway has consistently invoked a boundary based on a median line.
In light of UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 and the ICJ stance in the North
Sea Continental Shelf cases, the U.S.S.R. first and Russia as a
successor State have invoked “relevant circumstances,”88 such as the
shape and length of the Russian coast, and have drawn the maritime
boundary along the 32° 4’ 35” eastern meridian. In 2010, Russia and
Norway adopted the Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and
Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean,89 drawing an
equal boundary for part of the disputed area based on eight points.
Annex II to the Treaty prompts cooperation on transboundary
hydrocarbon resources and discloses the possibility of heavy oil
drilling.90
At the conjunction between the Atlantic Ocean and the Arctic Sea,
the Norwegian island of Jan Mayen has given rise to controversy.
Since 1929, Norway has occupied the island, which was then terra
nullius, using it for scientific and military purposes.91 This proves that
145–46, 149–50 (2011) (noting the positive impact of resolving fisheries
management and oil development controversies on the resolution of jurisdictional
disputes).
88. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Republic of Ger. v. Den.; Fed.
Republic of Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 101 (Feb. 20) (requiring
delimitation to take into account all relevant circumstances to ensure that each
party’s maritime boundaries represent the full area of its territory without extending
into the territory of the other).
89. Treaty concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents
Sea and the Arctic Ocean, Nor.-Russ., art. 1, Sept. 15, 2010,
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/internationallaw/innsikt_delelinje/treaty/id614006/.
90. See Treaty concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents
Sea and the Arctic Ocean, Nor.-Russ., Annex II, art. 1, Sept. 15, 2010,
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/internationallaw/innsikt_delelinje/treaty/id614006/ (obligating each party to exploit the area as a
unit in accordance with the unitization agreement and prohibiting the parties from
withholding permits for the drilling of wells for people lawfully allowed to explore
and exploit the area on their respective sides); see also Anatoli Bourmistrov et al.,
Driving Forces for Norwegian-Russian Petroleum B2B Cooperation, in
INTERNATIONAL ARCTIC PETROLEUM COOPERATION: BARENTS SEA SCENARIOS 79,
82–83 (Anatoli Bourmistrov et al. eds., 2015) (explaining that obligations under the
Treaty only allow joint development of the area and require each party to report and
enter into unitization agreements for fields found on one party’s side but extending
into the other’s).
91. See Odd Gunnar Skagestad, NATO Advanced Research Workshop, Joint
International Scientific Observation Facility on Jan Mayen Island, Address on the
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settlement is not necessary for exercising territorial sovereignty. In
1981, following the recommendations of a Conciliation
Commission,92 a bilateral Treaty defined a common maritime
boundary for the continental shelves of Jan Mayen and Iceland,93
giving Iceland a continental shelf of 200 nautical miles, following the
previously established EEZ, and defining a straddling joint area for
exploiting resources. In 1988, Denmark acted against Norway in the
ICJ.94 The Court adopted a median line as the point of departure but
shifted it towards Jan Mayen in light of relevant circumstances,
attributing to Norway and Denmark respectively 57 and 43 percent of
the disputed area.95 Norway and Denmark further adopted a treaty in
2008 governing joint exploration and exploitation of transboundary
hydrocarbons.96

B. EXPANDING SOVEREIGNTY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF CLIMATE
CHANGE
Climate change is severely impacting the Arctic region, actually
more than any other regions of the world, particularly owing to the
phenomenon of “feedback loop.”97 Given that it is light-colored, ice
Scope for Norwegian Commitments Related to International Research Operations
on Jan Mayen Island, 5–6 (Nov. 13, 2003) (effecting annexation by Royal resolution
and establishing a meteorological station in 1921).
92. Conciliation Commission on the Continental Shelf area between Iceland and
Jan Mayen: Report and Recommendations to the Governments of Iceland and
Norway, 27 R.I.A.A. 3, 30, 32 (1981).
93. See Agreement on the Continental Shelf, Ice.–Nor., art. 2, Oct. 22, 1981,
2124 U.N.T.S. 247 (the provisions in Articles 3 to 9 apply in an area defined by the
following coordinates: Latitude N Longitude W 70x35’ 10x30’ 68x00’ 6x30’).
94. See Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen
(Den. v. Nor.), Judgement, 1993 I.C.J. 38, ¶ 1 (June 14) (filing an Application to
institute proceedings against Norway on 16 August 1988).
95. See id. at ¶¶ 87, 90, 93 (establishing coordinate reference points of new
boundaries); Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen
(Den v. Nor.), Judgment, 1993 I.C.J. 41, 309 (June 14).
96. See Agreement concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits, Ice.–
Nor., arts. 1–2, Nov. 3, 2008, 2888 U.N.T.S. 13 (“Neither Party can begin
exploitation of any hydrocarbon deposit which extends to the continental shelf of
the other Party until agreement on the exploitation of the deposit as a unit is reached
between the Parties.”).
97. See David M. Lawrence et al., Accelerated Arctic Land Warming and
Permafrost Degradation during Rapid Sea Ice Loss, 35 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS
1, 1, 5 (2008) (arguing that positive feedback loops could amplify already “increased
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reflects sunlight back to space; ice-melting uncovers underlying
darker-colored water, which absorbs more sun light, accelerating
warming and ice-melting. The 2004 Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment reports that average annual temperatures have augmented
by about 2 to 3 ºC since the 1950s and by up to 4 ºC in winter.98 In the
1970s, the Arctic ice-cap covered most of the Arctic Circle, spanning
from the coast of Alaska to Canada and Russia. Currently, the ice-cap
is sensibly reduced and a large portion of the Arctic Ocean is free from
ice. In 2018, the extension of the Arctic ice-cap reached its sixth
minimum extension in the 40-year satellite record.99
The Arctic is rich in hydrocarbons; reportedly, the region contains
83 billion barrels of oil and 44 trillion cubic meters of natural gas.100
Projected reserves are mostly located in waters that are less than 500
meters deep. While it is not easy to exploit such resources, owing to
the difficult environmental conditions of the Arctic, increasing
temperatures and accelerated ice melting facilitate exploitation.101
Global warming is therefore a critical factor triggering claims to
extended continental shelves by Arctic coastal States, which increases
sovereign tensions, economic exploitation, and environmental
degradation. The European Union has gone as far as to impose
economic constraints on the U.S.S.R. as a response to economic
exploitation of the Arctic by Russian companies.102 The race to Arctic
shrubbiness, longer growing seasons, advancing treelines, shifting migratory bird
ranges, and declining caribou herd health”).
98. See HASSOL, supra note 6, at 23 (noting that annual average temperatures in
Alaska and Siberia have increased by 2-3º Celsius, while winter temperatures in
Alaska and Western Canada have increased by as much as 3-4º Celsius since 1953).
99. See Arctic Sea Ice Extent Arrives at Its Minimum, NAT’L SNOW AND ICE
DATA CTR. (Sept. 27, 2018), http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2018/09/ (noting that
ice in the Artic Sea reached a 4.59 million square kilometers minimum extent).
100. See E. Allison & B. Mandler, Oil and Gas in the U.S. Arctic: Managing
Resources in an Oil- and Gas-Rich but Harsh and Fragile Environment, AM.
GEOSCIENCES INST. (2018), https://www.americangeosciences.org/geosciencecurrents/oil-and-gas-us-arctic (representing sixteen percent of the global total in oil
and thirty-eight percent of the global total in natural gas).
101. See Kathrin Keil, The Arctic in a Global Energy Picture: International
Determinants of Arctic Oil and Gas Development, in GOVERNING ARCTIC CHANGE:
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, 279, 279–80 (Kathrin Keil & Sebastian Knecht eds., 2017)
(finding that rapid warming referred to as “Arctic amplification” has increased
temperatures in the Arctic at nearly “twice the rate as the rest of the world.”).
102. See EU Sanctions: A Key Foreign and Security Policy Instrument, EUR.
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resources triggered by global warming puts UNCLOS in unchartered
waters. In fact, it is possible that, if not satisfied by the CLCS in their
request to extended continental shelves, Arctic coastal States become
reluctant to comply with the Convention.103 Furthermore, the United
States is not a party to UNCLOS.
Ice melting also discloses the navigability of Arctic waters. When a
complete melt-out of sea-ice occurs, Arctic waters will become
navigable all year long. On the Russian side of the Arctic Ocean, cargo
vessels already navigate the Northern Sea Route, which connects the
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and is shorter than the route via the Suez
Canal.104 According to Russia, the Northern Sea Route is part of its
internal waters and no vessel has ever challenged such views.
However, the United States argues that the Northern Sea Route along
the Russian coast is an international strait, hence subject to the regime
of transit passage, given that the Arctic connects one part of the high
seas or EEZ to another part of the high seas or EEZ.105 On the other
side of the Arctic Ocean, the Northwest Passage offers several
shipping routes that are significantly shorter than the route via the
Panama Canal. In light of the decision of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel
case,106 according to Canada the Passage is subject to Canadian
PARL. DOC. (PE 621.870) 3 (2018) (restricting EU exports of technology and
services to Russia, hindering its ability to develop the Arctic oil reserves); see also
Natalie Dobson & Seline Trevisanut, Climate Change and Energy in the Arctic–The
Role of the European Union, 33 INT’L J. OF MARINE AND COASTAL L. 380, 381–82,
401–02 (2018) (characterizing the E.U.’s policy regarding the Arctic as focusing on
climate adaptation and sustainability rather than geo-political interests).
103. See Parker Clote, Implications of Global Warming on State Sovereignty and
Arctic Resources under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: How
the Arctic is no Longer Communis Omnium Naturali Jure, 8 RICH. J. GLOB. L. &
BUS. 195, 246–48 (2008) (arguing that wealth present in the Arctic may outweigh
the economic costs of non-compliance with UNCLOS).
104. See Emmanuel Guy & Frédéric Lasserre, Commercial Shipping in the Arctic:
New Perspectives, Challenges and Regulations, 52 POLAR REC. 294, 297 (2016)
(noting that ice melt has created new sea routes for Arctic States that are shorter than
“routes through Panama or Suez and Malacca”).
105. See Margaret Blunden, Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route, 88 INT’L
AFF. 115, 116 (2012) (explaining the dispute between Russia, the United States, and
the European Union, and noting Russia’s de facto control through its military
presence in the region).
106. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 36 (Apr. 9)
(considering that “by reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters in the
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sovereignty as part of its internal waters or of the territorial sea. The
United States, nonetheless, claims that the Northwest Passage is an
international strait, regardless of shipping traffic.107
As underscored by the Arctic Council, increased navigation by
ships transporting oil and gas as well as exploitation of energy
resources entail risks of spill, which is a major threat to the fragile
Arctic ecosystem.108 Furthermore, the Arctic is more inhabited than
the Antarctic. Notably, the Inuit are an indigenous population that
lives in the Northern Russian Federation, Northern and Western
Alaska, Northern Canada, and Greenland.109 Inuit traditional
knowledge of physical surroundings, including ice and climate, results
from experience accumulated over several generations, and is vital for
economic survival, culture, and identity. Climate change has an
adverse impact on the traditional everyday life and survival of the
Inuit, since it makes lands less accessible, valuable, and more
unfamiliar, harming property, subsistence harvest, travels, health, and
education.110

IV. FROM THE REALITY OF REGIONALISM TO
THE UTOPIA OF UNIVERSALISM?
HARMONIZATION AS A WAY FORWARD

course of the Operation of November 12th and 13th, 1946, the United Kingdom
violated the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of Albania, and that this
declaration by the Court constitutes in itself appropriate satisfaction.”).
107. See James Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest
Passage, 22 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 257, 267–68 (2007) (noting former
Ambassador David Wilkins’s statement that it is the longstanding position of the
United States that “the passage is an international strait.”).
108. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT REP. 4, 5
(2009) (finding that emissions from ships navigating in the Arctic will increase ice
melt and have other environmental consequences for the Arctic).
109. See
Makivik
Corp.,
The
Inuit
Circumpolar
Region,
https://www.makivik.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/circumpolar_region.gif (last
visited Jan. 14, 2020) (providing geographical data on locations of the Inuit and other
Arctic peoples).
110. See HASSOL, supra note 6, at 16–17 (explaining the impacts of a warming
climate on, inter alia, availability of game through habitat degradation and disease,
condition of sanitation infrastructure, and transportation rounds owing to thawing
ground).
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A. HARMONIZING THE REGULATION OF THE ARCTIC AND THE
ANTARCTIC
In light of the fact that climate change has fostered Arctic littoral
States’ claims to extended continental shelves, the World Wildlife
Fund (WWF) has underscored that UNCLOS does not provide an
adequate framework to govern the region: “[t]he political and
symbolic gestures of recent expeditions asserting territorial claims and
rights to unrestricted exploitation lead to nowhere and could revive
conflicts that have affected the region in the past.”111 Hence, a new
regional approach, including “thinking about a solid Arctic Treaty and
a multilateral governance body” is considered “the only way to ensure
the implementation of sustainable development regimes and help the
Arctic adapt to the severe impact of climate change and ultimately
stabilize the world’s climate.”112
Similarly, scholars have invoked a hard law approach for the
governance of the Arctic,113 including “appropriate institutional
arrangements and substantive rules, perhaps similar to those applied
in the Antarctic.”114 In 2008, the European Community proposed that
the European Commission prepare to pursue the opening of
international negotiations for the “adoption of an international treaty
for the protection of the Arctic, having as its inspiration the Antarctic
Treaty, as supplemented by the Madrid Protocol signed in 1991,”
which, “as a minimum starting-point” should “cover the unpopulated
and unclaimed area at the center of the Arctic Ocean.”115 Some legal
commentators invite to avoid “simplistic comparisons between the
111. See World Wildlife Fund, New Rules Needed for the Arctic (Aug. 17, 2007),
http://wwf.panda.org/?111440/New-rules-needed (believing that something more is
required for successful governance of the vast resources and new shipping routes
created by ice melt).
112. See id. (quoting concern of WWF’s Director of the WWF International
Arctic Programme).
113. See Molly Watson, An Arctic Treaty: A Solution to the International Dispute
over the Polar Region, 14 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 307, 319–20 (2009) (arguing that
it is necessary to decide if UNCLOS is controlling customary international law that
would bind parties and non-parties alike).
114. See Hauksson, supra note 14, at 23 (doubting the utility of using the
Antarctic Treaty in the Arctic because of sovereignty concerns, but offering it as a
useful foil).
115. European Parliament Resolution on Arctic Governance, P6_TA(2008)0474,
¶ N(15).

510

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[35:3

prospects for international cooperation in the Arctic region.”116
According to Timo Koivurova, “[t]he presence of territorial
sovereigns in the Arctic does not allow much room to develop a
collective model like the one in the Antarctic Treaty System, since it
is precisely the non-presence of territorial sovereigns in the Antarctic
that has enabled the creation of the present Antarctic Treaty
System.”117
Theoretically, an Arctic Treaty based on the model of the Antarctic
Treaty is a suitable solution in the short term with regard to the
fundamental problem of sovereignty. In fact, a Treaty freezing
sovereign claims over the Arctic would be a desirable outcome to
protect the region from expanding sovereign claims and to attempt to
preserve its ice-cap before melting becomes irreversible. This is a
typical case where a global factor can trigger a reshaping of regional
governance.118 In the long term, however, this approach would be
insufficient to safeguard the exceptional environment of the Arctic
because a regional convention is inadequate to constrain the conduct
of global actors.119 Climate change should thus trigger a shift in the
scale of governance, from the regional to the global level.120 In fact,
Young underscores that plans for triggering a process leading to a
regional legally binding agreement should be overcome by global

116. GAIL OSHERENKO & ORAN YOUNG, THE AGE OF THE ARCTIC: HOT
CONFLICTS AND COLD REALITIES 244 (1989).
117. See Koivurova, How to Improve Arctic International Governance, supra
note 11, at 94–95 (arguing that the Antarctic Treaty System’s success in keeping the
Antarctic region “as a region for peace, science, and environmental protection”
stems from the fact that “there are no active territorial sovereigns,” unlike the eight
territorial sovereigns in the Arctic).
118. See SÖDERBAUM, supra note 12, at 127–29 (arguing that traditional
transboundary resource management has failed to create the necessary governance
to protect transboundary resources and noting shifts of governance in regional
organizations from environmental to administrative bodies).
119. See Keil & Knecht, supra note 9, at 304–05 (noting that any legally binding
Arctic agreement would be binding on Arctic States only and would thus not
effectively regulate activity by non-Arctic States).
120. See SÖDERBAUM, supra note 12, at 127–31, 196–20, 221–22 (arguing that
complexities in global security governance are pushing States toward global
governance because they lack capacity to handle challenges to national interests and
are becoming more reliant on regional and global governing bodies to resolve
disputes).
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issue‐specific regimes.121
In practice, the idea of an Arctic Treaty based on the Antarctic
model is quite optimistic, given that eight coastal States protect and
seek to extend their sovereign areas in the Arctic.122 This is certainly a
realistic observation, which is quite troubling; in fact, if coastal States’
sovereign claims over the Arctic are seen as legitimate, there should
be no reason why sovereign claims over the Antarctic should not.123
Indeed, if it is true that sovereign claims over the Antarctic are less
firmly established than those over the Arctic, it is difficult to see why
land should not be subject to appropriation when sea is, particularly if
ice melting is not halted and the Polar Regions lose their exceptional
environmental value.124

B. OUTLINING A GLOBAL STATUS FOR THE POLAR REGIONS
According to some prospective models, the current Antarctic Treaty
System should naturally evolve into a regime of restricted sovereignty,
under a situation of “condominium.”125 This is seen as a progressive
process of improved cooperation and cession of power from core
Antarctic States to a regime of cooperative governance.126 Whereas
this approach is sufficient to address regional environmental issues,
such as oil spill accidents, the global nature of climate change should
shift the debate towards a more comprehensive and universal answer.
121. See Oran Young, Whither the Arctic? Conflict and Cooperation in the
Circumpolar North, 45 POLAR REC. 73, 80–81 (2009) (arguing that a variety of
human activities will take place in the Arctic that cannot be successfully managed
by a single regional agreement, and thus specific-issue regimes need to be in place
for issues such as haze, fishing, and hydrocarbon extraction).
122. See Koivurova, How to Improve Arctic International Governance, supra
note 11, at 94–95 (arguing that lack of sovereign disputes in the Antarctic has
contributed to the success of the Antarctic Treaty System).
123. See Andrew Blackie, Sovereignty on Ice: The Status of Antarctica in
International Law, 16–08 U. OF N.S.W L.J. STUDENT SERIES 1, 15 (2016),
http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLawJlStuS/2016/8.html (describing
the mechanisms of the Antarctic Treaty System and the validity of territorial claims
in the region).
124. See infra Section II.A.
125. See Wygene Chong, Thawing the Ice: A Contemporary Solution to Antarctic
Sovereignty, 53 POLAR REC. 436, 445 (2017) (explaining how the rise of the
Antarctic Treaty System could lead to a shift towards international condominium).
126. See id. at 437 (arguing that the Antarctic Treaty System has led to improved
international cooperation).
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More incisively, because of their exceptional natural features, in the
long-term the Polar Regions should be recognized as res communes
omnium, hence not subject to sovereign appropriation. In light of their
key role for the preservation of the global environment, the Polar
Regions should belong to everyone. Arguably, a common governance
regime would ensure “much-needed democratization of management
and increased legitimacy.”127 This approach follows the
“decolonization” of Antarctica proposed by developing countries;128
absent effective possession by States, the Polar Regions should be
considered a “common possession of all of the family of nations.”129
The argument is viable, to the extent that the Polar ice caps have not
yet reached the point where their complete melting is irreversible. In
fact, the Polar Regions should be recognized as global commons,130 in
light of the fact that disruption entails a high potential for
environmental damage, with negative effects for the entire
international community. Furthermore, to ensure the highest level of
environmental protection given the disruptive effects of climate
change, the Polar Regions should be considered common heritage of
mankind. This notion aims at minimizing the depletion of a resource,
as use must be in the common interest of humanity.131
While all areas currently declared world heritage of mankind are res
communes omnium, it is unclear whether the concepts of “res
communes omnium” and “world heritage of mankind” thoroughly
127. Loan, supra note 65, at 181.
128. See UNGA 37th Session, supra note 70, at 132 (affirming that uninhabited
lands do not legally belong to the discoverer); see also Hayashi, supra note 70, at
280 (explaining that developing countries objected to Antarctic territorial claims on
the basis of decolonization); Conforti, supra note 23, at 257 (laying out the basis of
the decolonization principle).
129. Balch, supra note 22, at 275; see also Conforti, supra note 23, at 251–52
(stating that the Antarctic Treaty System has the potential to establish a system of
lawful appropriation of natural resources amongst all nations).
130. See Grob, supra note 24, at 465 (arguing that Antarctica should be owned by
all nations, rather than any one).
131. See Hayashi, supra note 70, at 287–88 (defining the notion of “common
interest of mankind”); Conforti, supra note 23, at 257 (explaining that under the
common heritage principle, States have a duty to pursue the interest of the entire
international community); see also China’s Arctic Policy, at III and IV.2 (Jan. 2018),
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_28147602666
0336.htm (stating that China’s goal in the Arctic is to safeguard the common
interests of all countries).
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overlap or not; only some scholars answer the question positively.132
The regime of res communes omnium would facilitate monitoring
implementation of the status of the Polar Regions as common heritage
of mankind because all States of the international community would
be involved in protection. Establishing the Polar Regions as res
communes omnium would thus ensure a much more compelling
framework for the protection of their environment, particularly in light
of climate change, which is a transboundary global phenomenon. By
contrast, considering the Polar Regions common heritage of mankind,
but subject to sovereignty would compel Arctic and Antarctic
sovereign States alone to preserve the uniqueness of their
environment, outlining a weaker standard of protection in contrast
with the global nature of climate change. This is a critical point in
favor of the establishment of the Polar Regions as res communes
omnium, shifting governance from a regional scale to a global one.
The status of the Arctic and the Antarctic as common heritage of
mankind should be declared in a treaty governing the Polar Regions.
The Antarctic Treaty System already sketches this trajectory. In fact,
the Preamble to the Antarctic Treaty clearly states the importance of
the Arctic for humanity. Along these lines, the Eleventh ATCM
emphasised that, dealing with the question of mineral resources in
Antarctica, the Consultative Parties “should not prejudice the interests
of all mankind in Antarctica.”133 Furthermore, the Madrid Protocol on
Environmental Protection underscores that “the development of a
comprehensive regime for the protection of the Antarctic environment
and dependent and associated ecosystems is in the interest of mankind
as a whole.”134

132. Compare Loan, supra note 65, at 152–53 (explaining that common heritage
of mankind confers only the right to use an area, not the right to property, and is
essential to international agreements), with Rudiger Wolfrum, Common Heritage of
Mankind, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. ¶ 28 (2009) (arguing that
modern international agreements rarely include elements of common heritage of
mankind).
133. Report of the Eleventh Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, 20 POLAR
REC. 585, 591 (1981) (emphasis added).
134. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, pmbl., Oct. 4,
1991, T.I.A.S. 98–114 (emphasis added).
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C. HARMONIZING THE POLAR REGIONS AND THE UNFCCC
For the time being, the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty
requires States to only consider the environmental effect of their
actions when activities take place within the Antarctic Treaty area
(Article 3).135 At the same time, legal instruments and political
decisions under the UNFCCC reveal a complete absence of references
to the Polar Regions. The Polar Regions are only considered indirectly
in UNFCCC documents, for instance, in the context of studies on
indigenous people.136 This is due to several factors.
International regulation of climate change had already developed
when Polar institutions commenced to develop mitigation and
adaptation policies, making it complex to influence an already
organized agenda.137 Scientists have actually mentioned the Polar
Regions in U.N. climate talks, but the Arctic and the Antarctic have
not been considered from a legal standpoint. The United Nations has
thus far addressed the effects of climate change with an emphasis on
the vulnerabilities and adaptation needs of developing countries and
low-lying island States. By contrast, the United Nations assumes that
the Arctic is mostly a domestic policy issue, within the sphere of the
competence of industrialized circumpolar countries.138 However, these
considerations should only partially apply to the Antarctic, which also
includes sovereign claims advanced by Chile and Argentina.
Starting in 1989, the Arctic States have cooperated via the Arctic
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS),139 committing to
135. See id. at art. 3 (explaining the goals and limitations of environmental
protections in the region).
136. See
Query
for
“Polar
Regions,”
UNFCCC
Database,
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NWPStaging/Pages/Polar-Regions.aspx (last visited
Jan. 14, 2020) (demonstrating a lack of documents on the Polar Region in the
UNFCCC database).
137. See Henrik Selin, Global Environmental Governance and Treaty-Making:
The Arctic’s Fragmented Voice, in GOVERNING ARCTIC CHANGE: GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES 101, 115 (Kathrin Keil & Sebastian Knecht eds., 2017) (discussing
how international climate change law had already developed before the rise of
institutions like the Arctic Council).
138. See id. (pointing out that international climate change treaties often fail to
address the Arctic).
139. See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy: Declaration on the Protection
of
the
Arctic
Environment,
Jun.
14,
1991,
at
1,
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measuring the impact of anthropogenic pollutants, adopting preemptive measures and the tightest standards of protection established
under international conventions.140 Within this framework, the Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP)141 produced the
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, considering Arctic climate change
and its regional and global implications.142 The establishment of the
Arctic Council in 1996 has facilitated coordinating the programmes
established under the AEPS. However, the Arctic Council is a regional
forum that addresses climate change as a circumpolar issue, excluding
the influence of other States, rather than including the Arctic in
UNFCCC negotiations.143 The Council also does not have observer
status at the UNFCCC, and the United States particularly underscored
that, owing to its uncertain international legal personality, the Council
cannot claim such a status, consequently limiting the possibility of
contributing to the UNFCCC regulatory process. Following a similar
approach, State Parties to the Antarctic Treaty have consistently
rejected requests for governing Antarctic issues at the U.N. level.144
The Polar countries have also not specifically referred to the Polar
Regions in their written submissions under the UNFCCC. The
ministerial statements of some States, such as Finland and Sweden,
include references to the Polar Regions, while those of others, such as
the United States and Russia, do not. Input by the Inuit Circumpolar
Conference has thus far faced strong resistance within climate
negotiations; the message of indigenous peoples has not been accepted

http://library.arcticportal.org/1542/1/artic_environment.pdf (describing the history
of cooperation amongst the Arctic States).
140. See id. at 9 (describing the goals of the AEPS as protecting and preserving
the environment).
141. Arctic Monitoring & Assessment Programme, Organisational Structure,
https://www.amap.no/about/organisational-structure (last visited Jan. 14, 2020).
142. See HASSOL, supra note 6, at 34 (explaining the massive impact the Arctic
will have on climate change across the globe).
143. See David L. VanderZwaag and Hai Dang Vu, Regional Cooperation in the
South China Sea and the Arctic: Lessons to Be Learned?, in THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 171,
200–01 (Aldo Chircop et al. eds., 2012) (explaining the structure of the Arctic
Council and the influence exerted by Member States).
144. See Hayashi, supra note 70, at 288 (explaining that some nations view the
Antarctic as being under their own sovereign control).
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on the same footing as that of scientists.145 Consequently, Arctic
indigenous organizations have not been able to convey effectively
their message among the multitude of voices and communities
represented at U.N. annual climate conferences.
The Polar countries are also divided on commitment to global
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The European Union, including
Arctic and Antarctic States, supports legally binding commitments
based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. By
contrast, Canada, Russia, and the United States are favorable to nonbinding targets as eventually established in the Paris Agreement.146
Polar countries effectively have different GHG emission trends,
whereby Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Russia display decreasing
emissions, while Australia, Norway, Iceland, Canada, and the United
States display increasing trends.147 Per capita emissions also differ,
with Australia, Canada, and the United States displaying higher
concentrations than Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and
Sweden.148
In the long term, the Polar Regions should not be considered
isolated regimes within the international legal system, but as
integrated elements, whereby regionalism is an essential component
of the global legal system. While the international nature of the
UNFCCC process arguably “limits the opportunity to address regional
145. See JESSICA SHADIAN, THE POLITICS OF ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY: OIL, ICE AND
INUIT GOVERNANCE, 187–88 (2014) (describing how the Arctic Council has failed
to include traditional indigenous knowledge about climate change); see also SHEILA
WATT-CLOUTIER, THE RIGHT TO BE COLD: ONE WOMAN’S FIGHT TO PROTECT THE
ARTIC AND SAVE THE PLANET FROM CLIMATE CHANGE 296 (2015) (narrating the
history of the struggle against climate change for the Inuit and other indigenous
peoples).
146. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Annual Report 2017,
42–43
(2017),
https://unfccc.int/resource/annualreport/media/UN-ClimateAR17.pdf (describing the impact of the Paris Agreement on climate change).
147. See U.N. Environment Programme, Emissions Gap Report 2018, 4 (2018),
http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/26895/EGR2018_FullRepo
rt_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (listing emission trends for several countries);
Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser, CO2 and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, OUR WORLD
IN DATA (last updated Oct. 2018), https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-othergreenhouse-gas-emissions (displaying emissions data by income level).
148. CO2 Emissions (Metric Tons per Capita), WORLD BANK,
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=EN.ATM.CO2E.PC
&country=# (last visited Nov. 26, 2019).
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specificities,”149 according to the International Law Commission
(ILC), regionalism is “a privileged forum for international lawmaking.”150 Since the ecosystems of the Polar Regions transcend
national boundaries, it is indispensable to adequately include them in
the UNFCCC and related regulatory instruments. The Polar Regions
produce very few pollutants and cannot alone reverse the melting of
the Polar ice caps, rising sea levels, and disruption of ocean currents.
The melting of the Polar ice caps is largely grounded in external
factors and can only be addressed by halting the use of hydrocarbons,
first and foremost coal,151 and by limiting atmospheric pollutants.152
The UNFCCC establishes the objective of stabilizing GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system” (Article 2).153 Based on emission
levels in 1990, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol outlined reduction targets for
industrialized countries by 2012. Up to 2020, some industrial States
extended Kyoto commitments, while others agreed on voluntary
measures under the Copenhagen Accord.154 The Paris Agreement
introduced a system of nationally-determined contributions aiming at
“[h]olding the increase in the global average temperature to well
below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels” and “to pursue efforts to limit
149. Sébastien Duyck, Briefing Note, What Role for the Arctic in the UN Paris
Climate
Conference
(COP–21)?,
ARCTIC
YEARBOOK,
2015,
3,
https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2015/Briefing_Notes/1.BN_Duyck.pd
f.
150. Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Rep. on the Work of
Its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, ¶ 205 (Apr. 13, 2006).
151. See Ritchie & Roser, supra note 147 (explaining how different economies
create different emissions and how different hydrocarbons have different impacts on
the environment).
152. See Ken Coates & Carin Holroyd, Non-Arctic States and Their Stake in
Arctic Sustainability, in GOVERNING ARCTIC CHANGE: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, 207,
221 (Kathrin Keil & Sebastian Knecht eds., 2017) (stating that the rapid melting of
the Polar Ice Caps is driven mostly by forces outside the Arctic, the majority of
which are pollutants from more Southern nations).
153. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2, Mar. 21, 1994, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107, 169.
154. See Copenhagen Accord (Dec. 18, 2009) in U.N.F.C.C.C., Rep. of the
Conference of the Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, Addendum, at 6, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) (describing mandatory and voluntary
measures taken by developed nations to reduce emission levels).
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the temperature increase to 1.5 °C” (Article 2).155 The U.N. Climate
Change Secretariat considers the limits established under the Paris
Agreement “a defense line set at the global level.”156 However,
limiting global warming to 1.5 °C rather than 2 °C has critical
implications for the Polar Regions.157 It is therefore essential to lower
the acceptable compulsory threshold of temperature increase under the
UNFCCC to preserve the ecosystems of the Arctic and the Antarctic.
Scholars consider that a global extension of the obligation to take
into account the environmental protection of Antarctica “would
undoubtedly be beneficial for the preservation of the continent, and
subsequently for those States threatened by rising sea levels.”158
Similarly, it is assumed that, “[i]f the Arctic region is to avoid further
environmental deterioration and if there is to be a mitigation of
existing damage” it is necessary to establish “a sustainability
connection between Arctic and non-Arctic States,” particularly “in
global forums of environmental governance, such as the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the work of
the International Panel on Climate Change.”159 Thus, “[t]he manifold
and complex interdependencies between Arctic and non-Arctic
spaces, systems and processes necessitate the outlook of the Arctic as
a ‘globally embedded space.’”160 In this context, the distinction
between “Arctic” and “non-Arctic” States and issues should ideally no
155. Paris Agreement, art. 2(1)(a) (Dec. 13, 2015), in U.N.F.C.C.C., Rep. of the
Conference of the Parties on its Twenty-First Session, Addendum, at 22, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016).
156. Id. at art. 2(1)(a).
157. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Global Warming
of
1.5
ºC,
¶
B.4,
(2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_
Res.pdf (explaining that rising ocean temperatures have a more dire impact in the
Polar Regions compared to the rest of the Earth, owing to higher levels of acidity
and biodiversity).
158. Loan, supra note 65, at 178.
159. See Coates & Holroyd, supra note 152, at 222 (stating the importance of
cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic States to combat climate change); see
also Duncan French & Karen Scott, International Legal Implications of Climate
Change for the Polar Regions: Too Much, Too Little, Too Late, 10 MELBOURNE J.
INT’L L. 631, 653–54 (2009) (laying out the necessity for both regional and global
responses to the climate crisis in the Polar Regions).
160. Keil & Knecht, Governing the Arctic as a Globally Embedded Space, supra
note 9, at 302.
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longer make sense.161 In sum, there is “a two-way street involving
feedback loops and interdependencies” between the Polar Regions and
“global systems and processes in multiple ways and directions.”162
In practice, the inclusion of the protection of the Polar Regions into
the UNFCCC would be “vitally important”163 but quite contentious.164
However, the Arctic Council has declared the intention “to enhance its
action on climate change in the context of sustainable development in
the Arctic.”165 The UNFCCC Secretariat has underscored the necessity
of “an unprecedented level of cooperation including regional
cooperation” via institutions such as the Arctic Council.166 The
inclusion of non-Arctic States, such as China and India, in the Arctic
Council and extended participation to the Antarctic Treaty are right
steps in globalizing the protection of the Polar Regions from the
effects of climate change.167 Nonetheless, collective commitments
under the Paris Agreement are short of efforts necessary to achieve
even a maximum 2 °C increase in global warming.168
If integrating the Polar Regions into UNFCCC negotiations proves
complicated, it would be appropriate to require that regulation on the
161. See id. at 308 (explaining that, since the Arctic is so heavily influenced by
external factors, it is impractical to only rely on Arctic States to fight climate change
in the region).
162. Keil, The Arctic in a Global Energy Picture: International Determinants of
Arctic Oil and Gas Development, supra note 101, at 280.
163. Coates & Holroyd, supra note 152, at 223.
164. See Loan, supra note 65, at 178 (describing how the need for a treaty to bring
Antarctica into the common heritage of mankind to combat climate change will
certainly be contentious).
165. See U.N. Climate Change, Arctic Council Contribution to the Impact of the
Paris Agreement (Mar. 21, 2016), https://unfccc.int/news/arctic-councilcontribution-to-the-impact-of-the-paris-agreement (reporting the Artic Council’s
commitment to sustainable development in the Artic by reducing black carbon and
methane and by building resilience to the impacts of climate change).
166. Halldór Thorgeirsson, UNFCCC Dir. for Strategy, Address at Arctic Council
Ministerial Meeting (Mar. 15-17, 2016) (available in U.N. Climate Change, Arctic
Council Contribution to the Impact of the Paris Agreement (Mar. 21, 2016),
https://unfccc.int/news/arctic-council-contribution-to-the-impact-of-the-parisagreement).
167. See Coates & Holroyd, supra note 152, at 225 (indicating that the extension
of the Arctic Council to diverse nation States is one of the most promising efforts to
develop practical solutions).
168. See Ritchie & Roser, supra note 147 (predicting future emission scenarios).

520

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[35:3

Polar Regions includes binding GHG reduction targets beyond those
currently developed under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.
This approach has been put forward with respect to regulation
concerning the protection of cultural heritage.169 However, increasing
global GHG reduction targets under the World Heritage Convention170
exceeds the scope of the Treaty and is likely to trigger a fundamental
change of circumstances that would undermine its aim, according to
Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
By contrast, improving global GHG reduction targets under UNCLOS
and the Antarctic Treaty might not exceed the scope of conventional
obligations, given that environmental protection is an essential aim of
these treaties. Acknowledging the status of the Polar Regions as
common heritage of mankind would facilitate the universal
implementation of these measures.171

D. GLOBALLY PROTECTING THE POLAR REGIONS VIA CONSISTENT
CASE LAW
In a Petition submitted to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACommHR) in 2005,172 the Inuit raised the problem
of the justiciability of excessive GHG emissions. All Inuit groups
share a common culture based on adaptation to Arctic conditions,
including subsistence harvesting and traveling on ice; cold is essential
to the Inuit. The loss of thickness and lifespan of sea ice and the
169. See Erika J. Thorson, On Thin Ice: The Failure of the United States and the
World Heritage Committee to Take Climate Change Mitigation Pursuant to the
World Heritage Convention Seriously, 38 ENVTL. L. 139, 160 (2008) (arguing that
Article 6 of the World Heritage Convention requires State Parties to limit their GHG
emissions); see also William C.G. Burns, Belt and Suspenders? The World Heritage
Convention’s Role in Confronting Climate Change, 18 RECIEL 148, 161 (2009)
(suggesting that just one large GHG-emitting State that fails to limit GHG emissions
could be severely sanctioned by the World Heritage Committee).
170. See generally Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151.
171. See Section IV.B.
172. See generally Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Petition to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global
Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States, CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, at 70 (Dec. 7, 2005),
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ICC_Petition_7Dec05.pdf (claiming that the
“effects of global warming constitute violations of Inuit human rights for which the
United States is responsible”).
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increased unpredictability of weather have affected Inuit traditional
knowledge.173 The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment indicates that
increasing temperatures can go as far as to extinguish the Inuit
lifestyle,174 in breach of the right to culture and several other
fundamental rights, including, inter alia, the rights to property, health,
life, residence, and movement.
Based on the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Men, the 1966 Covenants on human rights and the UNFCCC,175 the
Inuit acted in the IACommHR against the United States for failing to
mitigate GHG emissions, considering that the country is responsible
for around 20 percent of the global amount of GHGs, and is thus one
of the main emitters in the world.176 Hence, the Inuit invoked a
decision recommending that the United States cap GHG emissions and
contribute to the efforts of the international community to limit
emissions.177 The IACommHR dismissed the petition, assuming that
the information provided did not “enable to determine whether the
alleged facts would tend to characterize a violation of rights.”178
Arguably, the dismissal is grounded in the impossibility of proving a
causal nexus between GHG emissions in the United States and
environmental damage in the Arctic, notably in light of the absence of
a justiciable right to a healthy environment under the American
Convention on Human Rights.179 It is indeed complex to prove that
173. See id. at 2 (explaining that traditional practices are becoming more
dangerous and difficult, owing to the loss of thickness, extent, and duration of the
sea ice, removing the need for traditional sea ice knowledge); see also Hari M.
Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 675, 685 (2007) (describing the
negative results of inadequately regulated emissions on the Inuit).
174. See HASSOL, supra note 6, at 16 (warning that the Inuit’s hunting culture is
likely to be destroyed by reduced sea ice).
175. See Watt-Cloutier, supra note 172, at 73, 93 (claiming that, since
international law protects the special ties that indigenous people have to their
environment, the Inuit have the “right to their own means of subsistence”).
176. See id. at 98 (quoting President Bush’s statement that the U.S. is the world’s
largest emitter of man-made GHG).
177. See id. at 7 (proposing that violations included in the petition can be
remedied by adopting mandatory measures to limit U.S.’s GHG emissions).
178. Letter from Ariel E. Dulitzky, Assistant Exec. Sec’y, Inter-American
Comm’n on Human Rights, to Paul Crowley, Barrister and Solicitor (Nov. 16, 2006),
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/science/16commissionletter.pdf.
179. See generally American Convention on Human Rights: “The Pact of San
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GHGs emitted in the United States cause specific damage to the Inuit,
in breach, for instance, of the right to culture.180
Domestic courts worldwide have progressively eroded the negative
regional approach taken by the IACommHR in the Inuit case. Notably,
in Urgenda a District Court in The Hague upheld the responsibility of
the Netherlands for excessive GHG emissions, based on a general duty
of care. The Court considered that, since “the current global emissions
and reduction targets of the signatories to the U.N. Climate Change
Convention are insufficient to realize the 2 °C target,”‘ the
Netherlands “is obliged [by a duty of care] to take measures in its own
territory to prevent dangerous climate change.”181 By inverting the
onus probandi, this approach excludes the necessity for the plaintiff
of demonstrating a causal nexus between GHG emissions in the
Netherlands and specific damage, excluding the “drop in the ocean”
argument. This paves the way to domestic actions aiming to reduce
GHG emissions not only against the State but also against private legal
persons, based on conflict of laws principles. From the standpoint of
public international law, this should trigger the possibility of interstate
action in international fora, such as the International Court of Justice,
based on the no-harm rule, subject to the principle of mutual consent.
On October 9, 2018, the Appeals Court of the Hague upheld the
decision of the District Court in Urgenda, confirming the obligation
of the Netherlands to reduce its GHG emissions by at least 25 percent
by 2020 with respect to 1990 levels.182 Unlike the first instance
José,” Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143; see also Megan S. Chapman, Climate
Change and the Regional Human Rights Systems, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y
37, 38 (2010) (noting that the petition faced the “tremendous burden of proving
legally sufficient causation between the harm resulting from climate change and the
acts and omissions of the U.S. government”).
180. See Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations
Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/52, at 9–10 (Feb. 1, 2016) (explaining that, since the adverse
effects of global warming are often projections about future impacts rather than
actual harm, proof of human rights violations will be difficult to establish).
181. See Judgment of 24 May 2015, Urgenda Foundation v The State of The
Netherlands, HA ZA 13–1396, EU:C:09:456689, ¶ 4.65 (establishing that the State
of the Netherlands had a “serious duty of care” to prevent the “high risk of hazardous
climate change”).
182. See Judgment of 9 October 2018, The State of The Netherlands v Urgenda
Foundation, NL:GHDHA:2018:2610, ¶ 73 (holding that the State of the Netherlands
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decision, however, the Appeal decision focuses essentially on the
rights to life and to private and family life under Articles 2 and 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).183 Crucially,
according to the judgment, in light of the UNFCCC commitment to
limiting global warming to 2 °C maximum, the ECHR creates an
“obligation to protect the right to home and private life,” which
“applies to all activities, public and non-public” based on a
precautionary approach.184 The Court seems to assume that excessive
GHG emissions directly breach the right to private life, disregarding
the need to prove specific damage. Within this context, the Court
interestingly excludes that adaptation measures are sufficient to
address the problem of climate change, given that it is not “clear or
plausible that the potentially disastrous consequences of excessive
global warming can be adequately prevented with adaptation.”185 This
approach significantly extends the remedies available against
excessive GHG emissions, including human rights procedures. A State
could indeed act in the European Court of Human Rights against an
Arctic country that is a Party to the ECHR and does not adopt adequate
GHG reduction policies, thus also constraining expansive policies in
the Polar Regions.
The decisions in the Urgenda case triggered a significant shift in
the climate policy of the Netherlands. Following general elections in
2017, climate change was fundamental in the negotiating process that
led to the constitution of a new coalition Government. In May 2018,
the Government announced that coal-fired power plants would be
banned as of 2030.186 In June 2018, a Climate Bill was introduced into
failed to meet its duty of care in “not wanting to reduce emissions by 25%”).
183. See id. ¶¶ 40–43 (elaborating on the interest protected by Articles 2 and 8 of
the ECHR, including the rights to life and to private and family life); see also
Jonathan Verschuuren, The State of the Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation: The
Hague Court of Appeal Upholds Judgment Requiring the Netherlands to Further
Reduce Its Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 28 RECIEL 94, 95 (2019) (indicating that
the Court of Appeal relied almost entirely on Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR).
184. See Netherlands, supra note 182, ¶ 43 (stating that the Court assessed climate
dangers in light of a State’s obligation to protect the lives of citizens under Article 2
of the ECHR).
185. See id. ¶ 59 (rejecting the State of the Netherlands’s argument that its
adaptation measures will clearly or plausibly prevent the “disastrous consequences
of excessive global warming”).
186. See Eric Wiebes, Uitfaseren van het gebruik van kolen voor
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Parliament, triggering negotiations for a National Climate Act.187 The
aim is to reduce GHG emissions by 49 percent by 2030, compared to
1990, and by 95 percent in 2050, including a thoroughly CO2‐neutral
production of electricity.188 Implementation is envisaged via cyclical
five-year climate plans, ensuring compliance with the Urgenda
decision.189 If climate plans prove inadequate to achieve set reduction
targets, statutes will provide a further and specific basis for action in
court.
In the case of Barragán v. Colombia from April 2018, the Supreme
Court of Columbia reversed a first instance decision and ruled in
favour of 25 plaintiffs acting against Colombian authorities and
private corporations for depleting the Amazonian rainforest and
increasing CO2 emissions.190 Holding the State and private
corporations in breach of the fundamental right to a safe environment,
the Court ordered Colombia to adopt an Intergenerational Agreement
and private corporations to adopt an action plan to safeguard the
elektriciteitsproductie (Phasing out the use of coal for electricity production), May
18,
2018,
at
1,
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/kamerstukken/201
8/05/18/kamerbrief-over-uitfaseren-van-het-gebruik-van-kolen-voorelektriciteitsproductie/kamerbrief-over-uitfaseren-van-het-gebruik-van-kolen-voorelektriciteitsproductie.pdf (stating that coal used for producing electricity will not be
permitted past January 1, 2030 and a transition period until December 31, 2024 for
two of the oldest plants); see also Bart H. Meijer, Netherlands to Ban Coal–Fired
Power Plants in Blow to RWE, REUTERS, May 18, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-energy-coal-idUSKCN1IJ1PI
(reporting the Netherlands’ law shutting all coal-fired plants by 2030).
187. Climate
Agreement
Timeline,
CLIMATE
POLICY,
www.government.nl/topics/climate-change/climate-policy (last visited Mar. 6,
2020).
188. See Eric Wiebes, Letter to the House of Representatives about the Proposal
for a National Climate Agreement (Jun. 28, 2019), 1, 16,
https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/parliamentarydocuments/2019/06/28/letter-to-the-house-of-representatives-about-the-proposalfor-a-national-climateagreement/Letter+to+the+House+of+Representatives+about+the+proposal+for+a+
National+Climate+Agreement.pdf (characterizing the Netherlands’ goal as an
“ambitious climate target”).
189. See id. at 21–22 (establishing the adoption of the Climate Plan for the first
time in 2019 and readoption at least once every five years).
190. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casación Civil,
abril 5, 2019, M.P. Luis Armando Tolosa Villabona, STC4360-2018, 48 (Colom.).
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rainforest and reduce GHG emissions, in accordance with
international regulation.191
In Juliana v. U.S., the U.S. Court for the District of Oregon rejected
a motion to dismiss a claim asserting the U.S. Government’s failure to
take sufficient action to limit GHG emissions.192 The Court indeed
assumed that “the right to a climate system capable of sustaining
human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society.”193 On this
basis, the Court considered that it can “make findings that define the
contours of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to life and a habitable
atmosphere and climate” and “declare the levels of atmospheric CO2s
which will violate their rights,” so as to “direct the federal defendants
to prepare and implement a national plan which would stabilize the
climate system and remedy the violation of plaintiff’s rights.”194 This
action, however, is littered with hurdles. On November 21, 2018 the
District Court of Oregon stayed the case, following an order by the
U.S. Supreme Court to vacate the trial in light of a defendant’s petition
for a writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.195 On
February 7, 2019, the plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent fossil
fuel developments by the U.S. Government.196 Several organizations
have filed amicus curiae briefs to support the stance of the plaintiffs
and the rights of future generations.197
Other actions have been unsuccessful. In Berth v. Secretary of State
for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the Queen’s Bench
Division Administrative Court of the High Court of Justice considered
U.K. legislation sufficient to achieve prospective GHG reduction
targets by 2050, in accordance with the Paris Agreement.198 In
191. C.S.J., Sala. Casación Civil abril 5, 2019, STC4360–2018, 49–50 (Colom.).
192. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d. 1224, 1263 (D. Or. 2016).
193. Id. at 1250.
194. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d. 1224, at 8 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15cv-01517-TC) (Findings & Recommendations).
195. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d. 1224, at 1, 6 (D. Or. 2016) (No.
6:15-cv-01517-TC) (Order).
196. See Urgent Motion under Cir. Rule 27-3(b) for Preliminary Injunction at 1,
Juliana v. United States, No. 18-36082 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2019) (Twenty-one children
and youth filed an urgent motion for preliminary injunction).
197. See generally Brief for Juliana et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting PlaintiffsAppellees, 21, Juliana v. United States, No. 18-36082 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2019).
198. But see Plan B Earth v. Sec’y of State for Bus. Energy, & Indus. Strategy,
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Greenpeace Nordic Association and Nature and Youth v. Ministry of
Petroleum and Energy, a District Court in Oslo assessed the
lawfulness of an oil exploitation concession in the Barents Sea by the
Norwegian Government in light of Article 112 of the Norwegian
Constitution, which establishes an intergenerational right to a healthy
environment.199 Besides the risk of spills in the Arctic environment,
which was considered limited and duly assessed,200 the Court
considered environmental damage arising out of CO2 emissions.
While GHGs due to combustion of exported oil and gas were regarded
as irrelevant to determining Norwegian emissions,201 the Court held
that Norwegian CO2 only constitutes 0.15 percent of the world
emissions and an isolated marginal increase would not determine the
unlawfulness of the concession.202 This case is under appeal, but
essentially demonstrates that judicial action addressing residual GHG
emissions, rather than comprehensive policies or specific highemission policies, is likely to fail.
In the People’s Climate Case, in May 2015, the Court of Justice of
the European Union rejected the request of ten families to compel the
European Union to reduce GHG emissions beyond the set target of
40% by 2030, with respect to 1990 levels, in light of the rights of life,
health, occupation, and property.203 On procedural grounds, the Court
[2018] EWHC 1892 (Admin), ¶¶ 42, 49 (deferring to the Secretary of State’s
discretion).
199. See generally Föreningen Greenpeace Norden v. The Government of
Norway Ministry of Petroleum & Energy, No. 16-166674TVI-OTIR/06, Judgement,
Oslo
District,
¶
1
(Jan.
4,
2018),
https://securedstatic.greenpeace.org/norway/Global/norway/Arktis/Dokumenter/2018/Judgement
%20-%204.%20jan%202017%20%20Oslo%20District%20Court%20stamped%20version.pdf.
200. See id. at 24–25 (“The impact assessment shows that a major sudden spill
may have a serious environmental effect, but based on experience from Norwegian
petroleum activities in other areas, the probability for such a spill is deemed low.”).
201. See id. at 21, 23–24, 45 (stating that the court assessed air emissions from
petroleum as marginal contributions to total emissions).
202. See id. at 23–24 (noting that 28% of the Norwegian emissions stem from the
petroleum industry); id. at 25 (considering consultation statements from the
Norwegian Polar Institute and the Norwegian Environment Agency).
203. See
Case
T-330/18,
Carvalho
v.
European
Parliament,
ECLI:EU:T:2019:324,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=214164&pageInd
ex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3747108 (last visited
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considered that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate sufficient and direct
damage.204 This approach contrasts with the decision of the Court of
Appeal in Urgenda, whereby excessive GHG emissions entail a direct
violation of the right to private life. The outcome could have been
different, had action been brought under the right to a safe
environment according to Articles 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the E.U. and 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the E.U.,
which are directly breached by excessive GHG emissions.
In sum, global jurisprudential developments reverse the initial
regional jurisprudence of the IAComHR in the Inuit case. Courts are
progressively holding State and non-State legal persons responsible
for not adequately implementing comprehensive climate policies in
line with internationally set targets, notably based on the duty of care
and the fundamental right to a healthy environment.205 A regional
situation has thus prompted a global change that has critical potential
to improve environmental protection in the Polar Regions, whereby
regional and global governance reshape one another. In a context
where international law-making is the result of interaction between
domestic and international law,206 in January 2018 the Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment prompted the U.N.
Human Rights Council (HRC) to consider the possibility of
acknowledging the “human right to a healthy environment” in “a
global instrument.”207 The step is particularly meaningful in the
Nov. 23, 2019) (stating that the applicants sought an injunction under contractual
liability under Articles 268 and 340 of the TFEU).
204. See id. (declaring the relief sought by the plaintiffs inadmissible because they
lacked locus standi).
205. See generally NON-U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case-category/human-rights/ (last visited Nov.
23, 2019) (for a comprehensive list of cases); see also Thomas A. Mensah, Using
Judicial Bodies for the Implementation and Enforcement of International
Environmental Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND
FRAGMENTATION: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF GERHARD HAFNER 797, 800, 807–
08 (Isabelle Buffard et al. eds., 2008) (providing examples of courts accepting
effective implementation and enforcement of international environmental law and
expanding the scope of standing in environmental protection suits).
206. René Urueña, Law-Making through Comparative International Law?:
Rethinking the Role of Domestic Law in the International Legal System, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAN KLABBERS, 161, 164
(Rain Liivoja & Jarna Petman eds., 2014).
207. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating
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context of general international law because it would allow action by
individuals and groups against the State in fora, such as the HRC itself,
that would be otherwise precluded, as the Inuit case demonstrates.

V. CONCLUSION
Predominant political practice and scholarly views address the
Arctic and the Antarctic from a regional perspective, resisting a
universal approach. Arguably, these paradigms are not necessarily
exclusive but can rather complement and influence one another,
whereby global governance takes regional peculiarities into account.
Given the significant impact of climate change on the Arctic and the
Antarctic, notably the fast melting of their ice caps, it is suggested that
regulatory action should be underpinned by the principle of
harmonization. Along the lines of a fundamental tenet recognized in
VCLT Article 31 and of the systemically integrated approach
proposed by the ILC, climate change should prompt a more universal
approach to the governance of the Polar Regions. Fragmented
regulation is indeed inefficient to preserve the exceptional natural
environment of the Arctic and the Antarctic as well as its influence on
the global environmental balance; a comprehensive approach is
required.
Harmonization should take place at different levels. First, in the
short term, the regulation of the Antarctic could provide a model for
the Arctic, thus harmonizing the regulation applicable to both the Polar
Regions. Arguably, the adoption of a comprehensive treaty for the
Arctic based on the Antarctic model is a suitable solution that would
allow sovereign claims to be “frozen” in the short term. Both Regions
are indeed “Polar;” therefore, they are covered by ice and essential to
preserving the global ecological balance. Second, in the long term, the
Arctic and the Antarctic should be recognized as common heritage of
mankind, which would allow environmental protection against climate
change to be strengthened via global action. Third, the Polar Regions
should be specifically harmonized with the UNFCCC and related
agreements, including ad hoc provisions, as currently there is no
adequate integration. Fourth, following the development of consistent
to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, ¶ 14, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/37/59 (Jan. 24, 2018).
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case law addressing States and private entities emitting excessive
GHGs, States should recognize the fundamental nature of the no-harm
rule as a human right under international law, thus expanding available
implementation mechanisms.
Considering the current status of international relations, it is not
easy to implement a universal approach at the law-making level, but
there are signs that such harmonization is not absolutely utopic. The
Polar Regions, specifically the Inuit petition to the IAComHR,
triggered consistent case law on excessive GHG emissions, which has
a turning point in Urgenda. Building on secondary rules, a process is
progressively developing that is spreading throughout different
jurisdictions worldwide, starting with The Netherlands, and is
prompting an inclusive implementation of sustainability at the lawmaking level. Within such a context, it is of critical importance to
acknowledge the key relevance of the Polar Regions from the
standpoint of primary rules, immediately shifting the focus of the Paris
Agreement towards a minimum and binding commitment not to
exceed a 1.5 °C increase in global warming. Time is of the essence,
but while the quick formation of a customary rule on sovereignty over
the Antarctic cannot be absolutely excluded, political hurdles make it
quite improbable that States will suddenly achieve consensus on a
binding minimum 1.5 °C target to avoid irreversible damage to the
Polar Regions and the global environment.

